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The article which follows was delivered as the Magister's address before the
Riccobono Seminar of Roman Law at Washington, D. C., on May 24, 1948 EDrro.
Even those who have turned the pages of legal history but
casually realize that many of the principles which today we
cherish as essential to a free democracy had their analogues and
predecessors, if not direct ancestors, in a past so remote that
not only the Declaration and Constitution but even America had
never been heard of. Such a precept is the one prohibiting two
trials of the same cause. As to civil or private suits, Gaius (c. 161
A.D.) tells us that subsequent action on a question which had
already been the subject of an action was always barred by direct
operation of law.' The exception rei judicatae when allowed in
litis contestatio seems to have been not merely a bar to the same
action between the same parties, playing the same parts, but
also to have enforced the principle, as between parties bound by
the judgment, that the content of the judgment must afterward
be assumed to be true. There had to be identity of res, object,
and causa, basis of claim, and juristic identity of personae par-
ties (e.g., principal and representative, principal and surety, suc-
cessors in title, legatees under an upset will). In one special case,
at least, there is a hint of the modern rule that, to be removed
from relitigation, the point must have been in issue. The judex
might or might not take compensatio, set-off, into account:
if he did, whether he allowed or rejected it, no future claim on it
could be made; but if the judex did not consider compensatio at
all, it had not been in issue and the exception would not lie.2
Under Justinian, the extinctive effect of litis. contestatio prac-
tically disappeared and the exceptio rei judicatae is-not found in
the Corpus Juris Civilis. Instead, the Code (529 A.D.) declared
that no one ought to be twice harassed for the same cause.3 That
an issue once decided must not be raised again is indeed a prin-
1G. IV, 108.
2 Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law (2nd ed. 1932) 699.
3 Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. c. 9.2.-9:11 Eisele, Abhandlungen, 113.
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ciple common to most systems of law, ancient or modern. As to
criminal actions, the later Roman law provided: Iisdem crimini-
bus quibus quis liberatus est, non debet praeses pati eundem
accusari.'
In France, the principle of non bis in idem came down through
the Medieval jurisconsults and has been incorporated in modern
French law in'the form of the rules as to chose jugis5 applying
to both civil and criminal actions. As to criminal prosecutions,
Napoleon's Code expressly provides that no person legally ac-
quitted may be again held or accused for the same act.6
The text-writers and most of the jurisprudence agree that for
operation of the plea of autrefois acquit there must be shown to
be identity of facts and of persons in the two prosecutions. In
Germany, according to the pre-war criminal law, if a person
committed several crimes.during the same transaction (e.g., rape,
incest and adultery), he might be indicted for and could be con-
victed of all of them, but his punishment was for that one only
for which under the law the punishment might be the most
severe. This principle of absorption as to penalty, poena major
absorbet minorem, applied to cases thus involving the "ideal
concurrence of crimes" (as opposed to real concurrence, several
crimes by the same person in several transactions), and did not
cover cases in which the commissi6n of one crime necessarily
included the commission of another crime (as murder includes
battery), when he would be indicted only for the more compre-
hensive crime.7 The Japanese Penal Code of 1908 follows the
German model." In Spain, how much direct Roman influence is
generally to be found in the Fuero Real (1225 A.D.) is very de-
batable, but in the Siete Partidas (1263 A.D.) there is a law on
this pubject for criminal cases which seems very like the Roman
dottrine: "If a man-has been acquitted by a valid judgment, of.
some offense of which he was accused, no one can afterward
charge him with the same offense." 9 Like the French, the mod-
ern Spanish law treats this question as a matter of cosa juzgada
for both civil and criminal suits, and requires identity of things,
4 L. 7, §§2 ff. De off. proc.
5 Merlin, Repertoire (Se ed. 1827) XI, 528. Dalloz, Repertoire (Nouu. ea. 1847)
VIII, 389. Sirey, Code D'Instr. Crim. (4e ed. 1903) 492.
8Art. 360. Toute personfte acquittee legalement ne'pourra plus etre reprise ni
acousee a raisons du rneme fait. Code d'Instruction Criminezle (1808).
7Edmund H. Schwenk, Criminal Law in Germany "(1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 541
at 563.
8 (1908) 2 Amer. Journ. Int. Law 845.
9 Quito seyendo algunt home por sentencia valedera de algunt yerro sobre que lo
hobiesen acusado dende adelante -non lo podrie otro ninguno acusar sobre aquel yerro.
Partida 1II, Titulo I, Ley 12.
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persons and actions.10 'The law of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The only issues which may be the subject of pre-trial discus-
sion are the following questions or exceptions . . .. 2 Res
judicata."" Fven the Latin-American Republics, which quite
frankly took the United States Constitution in some measure as
a model for their national charters, incorporated only limited
portions of the Bill of Rights Amendments, and in particular
the provision against double jeopardy is probably not found in
the Constitution of any other American nation today. Some of
them recognize in their criminal procedure the application of the
principles of re& judicata which exist in France and Spain, but
for the most part there is little text discussion and less jurispru-
dence on the double jeopardy problem. The explanation perhaps
lies in the circumstance that since the prosecution and punish-
ment of criminals was taken out of the hands of the Church and
given over to secular governmental authorities, the civil law
countries have never had to seek meticulous excuses and fine-
drawn pretenses to protect an accused person from the severe
harshness of the law, as in the early history of the criminal law
in England; and with the judge as trier of fact instead of a jury
capable of being unduly swayed by sympathy or emotion it has
not been so necessary for the prosecution to multiply serious
charges in order for justice to be done. Moreover, the criminal
in a Central or South American Republic generally has at his
disposal for legal retainers far less money than his United
States brother, and is much more apt to take his punishment and
get it over with, without constitutional or other doctrinal battles.
In England, with no written constitutional provision to be con-
strued or debated, the common law recognized the principle of
non bis in idem and prohibited a second trial for the same act of
a person once tried and acquitted.12 By an early precedent
since somewhat shaken but apparently still followed, 13 it was held
that to bar further prosecution, the indictment in the earlier trial
must have been sufficient in law. For reasons arising from the
difference in the procedure for prosecution, a misdemeanor was
formerly held to merge in a felony, so that a man indicted for
both on the same set of facts could be tried only for the felony;
10 Arrazola, Endo, Esp. de Der. y Admin. (1848) I. 511. Robles Pozo, Leyes y
Jurispr. Vigentes del Enjuic. Crim. (Madrid, 1890) 409. Aguilera de Paz, Comen-
trious a la Ley do Enjuic. Crim. (Ra ed. 1924) V. 189.
11 Art. 666. Seran itan solo objeto de artioulos de previo pronunciamento las
quedtiones o excepoones siguientes:-Ra La de cosa juzgada. Ley de Ednjuciamiento
Criminal (1882).
12 Turner's Case (1676), 84 Eng. Rep. 1068. See 33 A.B.A.J. 745.
13 Vaux's case, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (1590); followed: Wrote v. Wigges, 76 Bng.
Rep. 994 (1591); disapproved: Lord Hale, 2 P. C. 248, 393; rejected on another
point: R. v. Aylett, 8 Term Rep. 69, 99 Eng. Rep. 973 (1785).
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but this rule has long been abandoned. 14 The common law did not
recognize jeopardy, and considered that nothing short of a pre-
vious acquittal or conviction supported the plea in bar, but the
judges by interpretation gradually construed the protection to
exist as soon as the trial had effectively begun. Such was the
general state of English law on the question at the time of the
Revolution.
The framers of the Bill of Rights Amendments to the United
States Constitution adopted not only the common law but the
judge-made extension of it when they provided in what became
the Fifth Ampndinent: "Nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." With
the exception perhaps of the still difficult question as to some
statutory penalties as to whether they impose civil or criminal
sanctions, 15 a multitude of cases has by now made fairly plain
the general terms of the application and operation of this clause,
like the others of the Fifth Amendment. Despite the mention of
"life or limb" the provision is not limited to felonies, but covers
misdemeanors as well. United States courts have generally
though not unanimously settled on the swearing of the jury as
the moment at which jeopardy attaches, and so usually even if
the first indictment is defective in law.16 After some earlier sug-
gestions to the contrary, it is now settled that this provision is
to be interpreted exclusively as a restriction upon federal power
and does not create or sanction any limitation upon the rights
of the states to determine their own criminal procedure.1 7 Fur-
ther, the right granted by the Fifth Amendment is not included
under either the privileges and immunities or the due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, from which is derived
the federal power to correct state process.18 The Constitutions
149 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1933) 43, 132, para. 43-47, 212.
Ordinaoio .de Conspiratoribus (1305, 33 Edw. I), Stat. 2; 4 Complete Stats. of
England 265 (1929). Criminal Procedure Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, §28 (1851);
4 Complete Stats. of England 530 (1929). See 14 Eng. & Emp. Digest (1924)
110, 336. g
15 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 667; 21 R.C.L. 227.
16 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100 (1904). Citations in this and following notes are not intended to be exhaustive
but to offer only some leading, typical, or recent cases. A full compilation and
analysis of United States cases on double jeopardy to 1935 may be found in
American Law Institute, Administration of the Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy,
Official Draft with Commentaries, §§1-39 (1936). Later cases are collected in 15
Amer. Juris. 38-98 (1938); 22 C.J.S. 432, §288 (1940).
17 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 432 (1847); State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Atl. 231
(1918); Comm. ex rel. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 26 A. (2d) 190 (1942).
18 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1903); Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S.
81 (1928); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Commonwealth.v. Azer, 308
Mass. 153, 31 N.E. (2d) 549 (1941).
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of all but five of the states 9 have provisions against double
jeopardy, but because of varying wording, state decisions often
turn on statutory or procedural points, and, whether or not there
is a state constitutional provision, they may apply the local com-
mon law rule without regard to any federal constitutional ques-
tion. The prohibition against double jeopardy has been tradi-
tionally accepted as forbidding only two prosecutions by the
same sovereignty (under the Fifth Amendment, the United
States). Accordingly, in our federated union, where there are
two co-existent sovereignties over all territory within the boun-
daries of each state, a tremendous group of what a layman would
probably consider double prosecution cases, namely, prosecution
by the United States and separately by the State, for the same
acts and on the same state of facts, are not within the consti-
tutional prohibition.2 ° On a lower level, two prosecutions for the
same acts made unlawful by a state law and a municipal ordi-
nance are generally held not to be prohibited, 23 but this doctrine
has been criticized on theory.2 There is, it will be remembered,
no federal criminal common law,23 and all prosecutions by the
United States have to be founded on specific statutory provi-
sions; but the acts made criminal by an act of Congress may also
be criminal by the common law or a statute of a state. Further
to determine what is the same offense, the numerous cases show
a diversity of rules which are by no means uniform or consistent.
Perhaps a majority nominally adhere to the same evidence
test,2 some inquire if the same transaction- is involved, and a
few ask if the essential element is the same in the two prosecu-
tions. To constitute the same offense, the same or successive con-
nected acts must have operated against the same person, and
if two or more persons are objects, there is usually a separate
offense against each and there may be several prosecutions. The
test of the same evidence, however, is not a satisfactory criterion
by which to determine whether or not there is double jeopardy;
for if the agreement of two persons is necessary for the comple-
tion of the substantive crime and there is no ingredient in the
19 Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont.
20 Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
312 (1922).
21 United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (1948).
22 Charles M. Kneier. Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as
Double Jeopardy (1931) 16 Cornell L. Q. 201.
23 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S.
302 (1890); Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F. (2d) 413 (C.A. 6th 1946).
24 Successive Prosecutions based on the Same Evidence as Double Jeopardy (1931)




conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime, the same
evidence will sustain both convictions, yet there is no double
jeopardy; 25 and on the other hand, if two indictments for the
same conspiracy allege different overt acts, the evidence to sus-
tain the convictions would be different, yet there would clearly be
double jeopardy.26 A defense plea of double jeopardy, or motion
to quash theindictment on that ground, raises the issues of
identity or nonidentity of the person and of the offense, and is
one of law for the court if either fact is shown on the face of
the record; if not, the issues are of fact, and must be left for
the jury.27'
. Accustomed as we are to the various legal consequences of the
double jurisdiction under which we live in the United States,
we can perhaps readily understand the doctrine that double
jeopardy is not incurred by federal and state prosecution for the
same set of facts. Remembering, however, that this conclusion
is supposed to be based on the co-existence of two separate sov-
ereignties, against each of which the acts of the accused might
be separate offenses, we shall be forced to find a new ground
for the further doctrine that neither do two prosecutions under
different kinds of jurisdiction within the same sovereignty, as
by civil and military courts, constitute double jeopardy. Forty
years ago, the United States Sulireme Court held 28 that the
same acts constituting a crime against the United States could
not after the acquittal or conviction of the accused in a court
of competent jurisdiction be made the basis of a second trial of
the accused for that crime in the same or another court, civil or
military, of the same government. 29 In 1942, however, in the
case of the seven Germans who came ashore in New York and
25 Semble, United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926) (Ndtional Prohibition
Act).
26 Fleisher v. United States, 302 U.S. 218 (1937) (reversing on ground indict-
ment was faulty); Short v. United 'States, 91 F. (2d) 614 (C.A. 4th 1937) (rum
running). See Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev.. 925. Murphy v. United States, 285
Fed. 801 '(C.L 7th 1923); cert. denied, 261 U.S. 617 (1923) (conspiracy to rob
the mails and to conceal the stolen bag). A confederate had to serve his sentence
for four conspiracies because he did not appeal. Watkins v. Zerbst, 85 F. (2d) 999
(C.A. 10th 1936); Sprague v. Aderholt, 45 F. (2d) 790 (1930) (use of mails to
defraud, two registered letters). But see Francis v. United States, 152 Fed. 155
(C. . 3d, 1907) cert. denied, 206 U.S. 565 (1907) (conspiracy to use mails to de-
fraud in fictitious cotton speculations, mailing of each letter supports separate
conspiracy charge).
27 Short v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 614 (C.A. 4th 1937).
28 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) (Philippines). Explained:
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). Followed: Wade v. Hunter, 72 F.
Supp. 755 (1947) (former court-martial jeopardy). Had been contra: United States
v. Cashiel, 25 P.C. 318 (1863); In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (1900).




Florida from German submarines, the Supreme Court held30 that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not extend the right to
demand a jury to trial by military tribunals. The Fifth Amefid-
ment had been accepted as requiring the court to permit counsel
to represent and to assist the accused, even in court-martial
proceedings,31 but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals appar-
ently held, on the authority of the Quiri case, that the Fifth
Amendment in its entirety was inapplicable to a court-martial,32
and the Supreme Court declined to review the decision after the
cause became moot. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this
last year affired a district court decision that a naval court's
denial of a plea of double jeopardy, even if erroneous, is not
subject to correction or review by a civil court, but on the ground
that they would assume to look into the question, and then found
successive naval courts-martial for assault with intent to murder
and manslaughter not double jeopardy.3 3 If this case goes
higher, the Supreme Court's decision will be of great interest;
but if the majority of the lower courts has in recent years been
correct hi interpreting the Supreme Court's doctrine, there is
no protection in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment against trials of the same person by both courts-martial
and civil courts for the same acts.
The Federal crime of conspiracy was first created immediately
after the Civil War by the 39th Congress, by an enactment which,
as Section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code (1948 Revi-
sion) now provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of
the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
such misdemeanor.34
30 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Followed: Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp.
808 (1945).
31 Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. (2d) 435 (C. 5th 1940); cert. denied, 312 U.S.
697 (1941).
32 United States ez rel. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. (2d) 576 (C.k. 2d 1943); cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 755 (1943); rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 789 (1943).
33Wrublewski v. McInerney, 166 F. (2d) 243 (C.A. 9th 1948); affirming 71
F. Supp. 143 (1947).
34Rev., 18 U.S.C. 371 (1948); C. 645 in effect Sept. 1, 1948; 62 Stat. 683.
Criminal Code, c. 4, §37. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 169, §30; 14 Stat. 484; Rev. Stats.(1873-74), c. 5, §5440; Act of May 17, 1879, c. 8; 21 Stat. 4; Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
c. 321, §88; 35 Stat. 1096; 18 U.S.C. §88.
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As passed in 1867, the statute, purporting generally to amend
the internal revenue acts, specified that the newly created crime
was a misdemeanor, but that provision was omitted in 1873 when
the enactment became Section 5440 of the Revised Statutes, and
a further amendment of 1879 omitted the minimum of $1000
which had been stated for the fine and added "or both" to the
possible punisl ment. The Criminal Code declares all crimes pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment for over one year to be fel-
onies, all others are misdemeanors, 5 so that whatever doubt may
have been left by the mere omission of the original declaration
exists no longer and the federal crime of conspiracy is a felony.
The common'law rule of merger did not apply if both offenses
were misdemeanors. If both were felonies,36 a substantive of-
fense merged in the crime of a conspiracy to commit it,37 but
the jS-preme Court has declared this rule to have little vitality
in the United States, 8 and the rule that a misdemeanor merged
in a felony was apparently not applied in this country to a
conspiracy even when it was a misdemeanor.3 9 Congress has
a general power to create, describe and define federal crimes,
and accordingly it may separate a substantive offense and the
conspiracy to commit that offense and attach to each a different
penalty.40 As they are separate crimes, a conviction for the con-
spiracy may be had whether the substantive offense was com-
pleted4' or not.42
The courts run into real difficulties when they try to fix pre-
cisely the part played by the overt act in the federal offense of
conspiracy. The Supreme Court sixty-five years3 ago explained
that under Revised Statutes, Section 5440, the offense was the
conspiracy alone:
The provisions of the statute, that there must be an act done to
effect- the object of the conspiracy, merely affords a locus penitentiae,
35 Criminal Code, c. 14, §212; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, §335; 35 Stat. 1153;
18 U.S.C. §335. In effect, Jan. 1, 1919.
36 Waldeck v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 243 (C.A. 7th.1924).
37 12 Cornell L.Q. 136 (1931).
88 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (violation of Internal Revenue
Code). United States v. Sorrentino, 78 F. Supp. 425 (1948) ; Brown v. United States,
167 F. (2d) 772 (C.C-A. 8th 1948); Rutledge v. United States, 168 F. 2d 776 (C.A.
8th 1948) ; Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F. 2d 846 (C.A 9th 1948) ; affarmed(1949) ; 336 U.S. 613, 69 Supr. Ct. 766, May v. U.S., 175 Fed. 2d 994 (C.A. D.C.
1949), cert. den. (1949), 338 U.S. 000, 70 Supr. Ct. 58, 80, 154. 62 Harvard Law
Rev. 1226 (1949).
39 Commonwealth v. Walker, 198 Mass. 309 (1871). Commonwealth v. Marsino,
252 Mass. 224, 147 N.E. 859 (1925); People v. Tavormina, 257 N.Y. 84, 177 N.E.
317 (1931); noted (1931) 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 231; (1931) 6 St. John's L. Rev. 94.
40 Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895) (obstructing the mails).
41 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913) (Sherman Antitrust Act).
42 United States v. Bayer, note 28 supra (court-martial and civil court).
43 United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 204 (1885) (National Bank dividend).
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so that before the act done either one or all of the parties may
abandon their design, and thus avoid the penalty prescribed by the
statute. It follows that ... the conspiracy must be sufficiently charged
and that it cannot be aided by the averments of acts done by one or
more of the conspirators in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
Under this theory sixteen years later a defendant acquitted
under an indictment for conspiracy to utter a false nataraliza-
tion certificate was allowed (with a dissent) to be tried again on
an indictment for uttering. the same false certificate, on the
ground that the act to effect the object of the conspiracy was no
part of the offense under Section 5440 and the uttering was not
originally charged as an independent offense."
This doctrinal theory stood for nearly thirty years, and then
the Supreme Court considered the question further in Hyde v.
United States.45 In an indictment for conspiracy to defraud the
United States by fraudulently acquiring public lands, the con-*
spiracy was charged to have been formed in the District of
Columbia and some overt acts were charged to have been per-
formed there and others in California. The evidence disclosed
that the conspiracy if any had been formed in California and
only one of the defendants had been in the District of Columbia,
but the Court upheld the trial in the District as proper venue on
the ground that any overt act there made all the other conspir-
ators constructively present there46 and Mr. Justice McKenna
for the Court went on to say:
It seems like a paradox to say that anything, to quote the Solicitor
General, "can be a crime of which no court can take cognizance".
The conspiracy, therefore, cannot alone constitue the offense. It
needs the addition of the overt act. Such act is something more,
therefore, than evidence of a conspiracy. It constitutes the execu-
tion or part execution of the conspiracy and all incur guilt by it,
or rather complete their guilt by it, consummating a crime by it
cognizable then by the judicial tribunals, such tribunals only then
acquiring jurisdiction.47 * * * We realize the strength of the appre-
hension that to extend the jurisdiction of conspiracy by overt acts
may give to the government a power which may be abused, and we
do not wish to put out of view such possibility.48
Two years later the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 9 that
on an indictment under Section 5440 charging a conspiracy to
44 Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Fed. 452 (C.A. 3d 1899). Cf. Wyatt v. United
States, 23 F. (2d) 791 (C.A. 3d 1928).
45 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
46 Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392 (1912). United States v. McCarthy (C.A. 2d
1948), 170 Fed. 2d 267.
47 225 U.S. 347 at 359. Ladner v. United States, 168 F. (2d) 771 (C.A. 5th 1948).
48 225 U.S. 347 at 363. Cf. United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 78 F. Supp. 409
(1948).
49 Houston v. United States, 217 Fed. 852 (C.A. 9th 1914) ; cert. denied, 238 U.S.
613 (1915) (fraudulent coal contracts).
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defraud the United States, overt acts other than those specifically
named in the indictment might be proved, and that conspiracy
might be a continuing offense, so that the statutory period of
limitation of three years ran only from the last overt act
proved.50 In dissenting, Judge Ross remarked :-
The present indictment was undoubtedly drawn with the mani-
fest purpose, as I think,, of avoiding the statute of limitations.
Since then, however, the District Courts and the Circuit Courts
of Appeals have allowed the prosecuting District Attorney to
manipulate the overt act for separate and additional convictions
practically as they like.
Defendants maybe convicted upon charges of conspiracy to
use the mails to defraud51 although the use of the mails was un-
premeditated and merely incidental52 or not contemplated in the
scheme at all,5 nor need the letter mailed be to or from the in-
tended vietim, 54 nor disclose on its face any fraudulent represen-
tation or purpose,55- -and the mailing of the same letter may
constitute the overt act needed on the conspiracy charge and also
serve for conviction under a count for a specific mailing to de-
fraud.56 Acquittal of a charge of conspiracy to use the mails to
defraud in the sale of corporate stock is no bar to a conviction
for using the mails to defraud by the same scheme.57 Under the
former National Prohibition Act, acquittal on a count charging
'the manufacture of intoxicating liquor did not bar a conviction
for conspiracy to manufacture, sell and possess the same liquor.58
The Seventh Circuit59 held that if two indictments for conspir-
acy to violate the Prohibition Act alleged different overt acts,
proof of an act averred in the second would not support a con-
viction under the first, so there. was no double jeopardy.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said that several crimes
cannbt be carved out of one unlawful act, 60 but it also appears ,
that only one of several acts charged need be proved, any minor
50 Cf. Brown v. Elliott, note 46 supra. United States. v. Krulewitcb, 167 F. (2d)
943 (C.A. 2d 1948).
51 Criminul Code, e. 1, §215; Act of June 8, 1872, c. 335; 17 Stat. 323; Rev. Stat.
(1873-74), c. 5, §5480; Act of Mar. 2, 1909, e. 321, §215; 35 Stat. 1130; 18 U.S.C.
§338.
52 Hendrey v. United States, 233 Fed. 5 (C.A. 6th 1916); United States v. Grayson,
166 F. (2d) 863 (C.A. 2d 1948).
53 Freeman v. United States, 244 Fed. 1 (C.A. 7th 1917).
54 Ibid.
55 Chew v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 348 (C.A. 8th 1925).
56 Ibid. Reining v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 362 (C.A. 5th 1948).
57 Mitchell v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 260 (C.A."9th 1927). United States v.
Tannuzzo (C.A. 2nd 1949), 174 Fed. 2d 177.
58 Meucci v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 508 (C.A. 9th 1928).
59 Ferracane v. United States, 29 F. (2d) 691 (C.A. 7th 1928).
60 Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F. (2d) 352 (C.A. 5th 1930) (Narcotic Act).
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thing will do, 61 and it need not be any act charged in the indict-
ment.62 Acquittal of a -conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act
was no bar to prosecution under a charge of simple conspiracy,
differing as to some defendants and the number of counts and
omitting former allegations as to the design.6 A conspiracy
may be charged as consisting of an agreement to commit several
offenses, in which case proof of an agreement to commit any one
of them is sufficient.64
The Supreme Court has said that there can be no valid federal
indictment for a conspiracy to do an act which is not an offense
against the United States,65 but the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained a conviction of labor union members under
an indictment for conspiracy to commit against the United
States the crime of transporting explosives in interstate com-
merce, although the purpose of such transportation was the.
destruction of open shops which would be an offense against and
punishable only by state laws. 66 After an acquittal of one of two
persons charged with conspiracy, the other person must be ac-
quitted, "conspiracy being an offense which can be committed
only by two or more persons," 6' 7 but the co-conspirators need not
be named in the indictment. 6 A jury may of course acquit on
some counts and convict on others of the same indictment or on
the same trial, and the federal courts have held that no matter
how seemingly inconsistent, illogical or irrational the convic-
tions will be upheld. There is likewise no difficulty in upholding
convictions of substantive crimes despite an acquittal of con-
spiracy in which the same events were charged as the overt
acts.6 9 The converse situation, however, in which there has been
an acquittal of all the substantive offenses and a conviction for
conspiracy on the same facts, if in separate trials, would seem
clearly to involve the issue of double jeopardy; but although
some federal courts expressed earlier doubts, all appear now to
61 Frederick v. .United States, 292 Fed. 856 (C.A. 9th 1923) (National Prohibition
Act).
62 Meyers v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 859 (C.A. 3d 1929).
63 United States v. Wills, 36 F. (2d) 855 (C.A. 3d 1929). Cf. Braverman v. United
States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942); Thomas v. United States, 168 F. (2d) 707 (C.A. 5th
1948). United States v. Curzio (C.A. 3rd 1948), 170 Fed. 2d 354. United States v.
Zeoli (C.A. 3rd 1948), 170 Fed. 2d 358.
64 United States v. Baker, 61 F. (2d) 469 (C.A. 2d 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
602 (1932); McWhorter v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 829 (C.A. 5th 1933); United
States v. Speed, 78 F. Supp. 366 (D.C. D.C., 1948).
65 United States v. Britton, note 43 supra.
66 Ryan v. United States, 216 Fed. 13 (CA_ 7th 1914).
67WiUiams v. United States, 282 Fed. 481 (C.A. 4th 1922); United States v.
'Holdsworth, 77 F. Supp. 148 (S.D., Me. 1948).
68 Norton v. United States, 295 U.S. 136 (C.A. 5th 1923). Cf. Grove v. United
States, 3 F. (2d) 965 (C.A. 4th 1925), aff'd., 268 U.S. 691 (1925).69 Woodbury Corp. v. Pick, 41 F. (2d) 148 (C.A. ist 1930).
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have agreed that the conspiracy conviction may stand.70 This
amounts in effect to holding that the overt act needed and
charged to enable the crime of conspiracy to be prosecuted
need not itself be a federal crime. Finally, the Supreme Court
on Jan. 5, 1948, said that if an acquittal of a conspiracy
charge involved a determination favorable to the defendant of
facts essential to conviction of a substantive offense, the doc-
trine of res judicata, which applies to criminal as well as to
civil proceedings, will be a defense to a second prosecution. 71
The practice of United States Attorneys in using conspiracy
charges to secure more freedom as to evidence and avoidance
of the statute of limitations to obtain more and easier and
double convictions, to bolster their personal records for diligence
and efficiency, has been the subject of various strictures from
the bench. Nearly forty years ago District Judge Holt said :72
There seems to be an increasing tendency in recent years for
public prosecutors to indict for conspiracies when crimes have been
committed. A conspiracy to commit a crime may be a sufficiently
serious offense to be properly punished; but when a crime has actually
been committed by two or more persons, there is usually no proper
reason why they should be indicted for the agreement to commit
the crime instead of for the crime itself. * * * Prosecutors seem to
think that by this practice all statutes of limitations and many of
the rules of evidence established for the protection of Persons charged
with crime can be disregarded. But there is no mysterious potency
in the word "conspiracy". If a conspiracy to commit a crime has
been carried out, and the crime committed, the crime, in my opinion,
cannot be made something else'by being called a conspiracy.
In 1925, the Conference of Circuit Judges wrote :7
We note the prevalent use of conspiracy indictments for convert-
ing a joint misdemeanor into a felony; and we express our convic-
tion that both for this purpose bmd for the purpose-or at least
with.the effect-of bringing in much improper evidence, the con-
spiracy statute is being mueh abused. Although in a particular case
there may be no preconcert of plan, excepting that necessarily in-'
herent in mere joint action, it is difficult to .exclude that situation
from the established definitions of conspiracy; yet the theory which
permits us to call the aborted plan a gredter offense than the com-
pleted crime supposes a serious and substantially continued group
scheme for cooperative law breaking.
70 Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1931) (Butler J., dissenting). Samuel v.
United States (C.A. 9th 1948), 169 Fed. 2d 787.
71 Williams v. United States, 282 Fed. 481 (C.A. 4th 1922). Norton v. United
States, 295 Fed. 136 (C.A. 5th 1923). Cf. Grove v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 965(C.A. 4th 1925), aff'd., 268 U.S. 691 (1925); United States v. Negro, 164 F. (2d)
168 (C.A. 2d 1947), Noted, (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 705.
72 United States v. Kissel, 173 Fed. 823, 828 (C.C. N.Y. 1909). Of. United States
v. Sherman (C.A. 2nd 1948), 171 Fed. 2d 619.
73 Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 1925. Rep. Att. Gen. (1925) 5-6. 328
U.S. 644, n. 4. Cf. Holmes, J., in Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913).
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All this, of course, merely scratches the surface of the great
problem of the conflict of federal conspiracy charges with the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, but enough
has been adduced, even in the absence of any statistics from the
Attorney-General's office, to indicate the extent of the abuse of
the conspiracy statute by federal prosecutors, frequently upheld
and aided by the lower courts in the usually laudable endeavor
to give society and the state at least an even break in the modern
light against crime.74  In a post-war period which is witness-
ing unprecedented invasion of the supposed rights of individuals
from many directions, it is especially important that the con-
stitutional issues be recognized and vigilantly presented. The
evasion and nullification of the Fifth Amendment is not the
result of generations of community habit, as violations of the
Fourteenth mpay by some be said to be, but is the self-serving
production of a small class of office holders which could be imme-
diately and effectively terminated by a firm order, meant to
be obeyed, from their common chief, the Attorney-General of
the United States, or from his single superior in the govern-
mental world. If lawyers were determined and united the
abuse could be stopped at once and forever.
74 United States District Court Criminal Cases; Annual Reports of the Attorney-
General of the United States.
For the Fiscal Criminal Defendants Defendants
year ending cases in cases guilty in
June 30th terminated terminated all or part
1937 35,461 52,167 41,961
1938 34,324 51,877 41,744
1939 35,695 53,053 , 43,083
1940 33,861 52,014 42,536
1941 32,207 49,237- 40,100
1942 31,818 48,292 39,449
1943 35,793 47,955 35,378
1944 40,436 50,342 38,277
1945 39,209 48,990 39,197
1946 35,280 44,947 35,569
1947 35,474 44,685 36,021
Classification of cases by crimes does not show conspiracies separately, which the
Attorney-General's office says is " (impractical' ".
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